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SESSION FOUR




P ROVISION for air traffic control services, as organized at an inter-
national level today, finds its legal and political basis in the Chicago
Convention and in the norms and recommendations issued by the Inter-
national Civil Aviation Organization which the Member States have ac-
cepted. There is no need for me to make a case here for continued and
increased standardization of ATC procedures throughout the world. This
need has long been recognized, and the worldwide acceptance of its con-
sequences has been translated into practice to such an extent that we now
take it for granted. In addition, all countries have accepted the principle
that responsibility for the provision of control services falls to the State
-it is a part of the public function or one of the many burdens that
governments assume in the world of today. The formal expression of this
principle is to be found in Article 28 of the Chicago Convention.
In carrying out its responsibility, a government has several options; but
until recently, States have acted individually. The emergence of interna-
tional agencies charged with the collective providing of these services is
a relatively new experiment; it is one which, if successful and if technical
reasons require it, may be repeated until it becomes the general rule in-
stead of the exception. Although the States act individually, in general
they cooperate in the realm of standardization of ATC and many other
procedures without which international air transport could not function.
Collective provision of air traffic services by groups of two or more
neighbouring States is not expressly envisaged in the Chicago Convention
or in its Annexes, but it is not forbidden. Legal argument apart, a bar to
cooperation would run counter to the spirit of the Convention. Moreover,
the initiative of ICAO is responsible for the preparatory work leading to
the creation of the Society for Air Navigation Services of Central
America.
Although the imperatives that brought about the creation of interna-
tional air traffic control agencies do not require the complete transfer of
national sovereignty over airspace, the exercise of national sovereignty has
been curtailed insofar as competency in certain fields has been transferred
to the international control body to which the States belong. Responsibility
t LL.D.; Former Judge & President of the Court, Elizabethville, Congo; Judge, Luxemburg
(Presently on Secondment); Presently Head of Eurocontrol, Legal Service; Charge de Cours, Law
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for control services is accepted by modern States. Transfer of competence
for those services by two or more neighboring States to an international
agency created by them implies no desire on their part to rid themselves
of this responsibility; rather, it indicates a keener awareness of it. It is an
act dictated by political, financial and technical imperatives. The Member
States retain their ultimate responsibility to each other and to third States;
their financial commitment to the ATC is an expression of that responsi-
bility.
II. WHY NATIONS CREATE INTERNATIONAL ATC AGENCIES
Necessities rather than mere passing reasons led some nations to set up
international agencies entrusted with the provision of air traffic services.
These necessities are dominantly technical. They arise from the increased
speeds of modern jet aircraft and performance characteristics which differ
from those of piston engine and turboprop aircraft.' The technical factors
added to the limits and situation of national territories have led nations
in some parts of the world to the realization that provision of air traffic
services on an exclusively national basis is not sufficient. As early as July
1957, the Air Navigation Commission of ICAO found that it would be
desirable to extend the area of Flight Information Regions as much as
possible in order to cope with increased speeds of turboprop aircraft.'
If the ideal Flight Information Region is equal to or greater in area than
the territories of several neighboring countries, then collective provision
of services is a logical extension of the ICAO finding. The element of
national territory is therefore most important. For example, modern jet
aircraft on a flight from Paris to Hamburg will overfly four countries
and cross a state like Belgium in a matter of minutes. On a direct flight
from Paris to Copenhagen, an aircraft overflies five countries. Not so very
long ago, it took the DC-3 four hours to cover the distance; the Boeing
707 has cut the flight time to just over an hour. The Concorde and the
American SST will make the flight in 29 and 19 minutes respectively, cross-
ing a country like the Netherlands in 4 and 3 minutes. Frequency switch-
ing to ensure communications between a control center and aircraft, and
time required for control operations, are more important problems than
ever before. Thus, the combined effect of (1) modern aircraft character-
istics (particularly speed and cruising altitudes) and (2) density of air
traffic, coupled with the existing territorial situation in Western Europe,
has obliged States to adopt a community solution.
In Africa and in Central America where similar situations have been
found, somewhat different factors have been influential. Thus, comparison
of Africa, Central America, and Europe is called for. In Africa, twelve
recently independent States plus the French Republic formed the organiza-
tion known as ASECNA (Agence pour la S&urit6 de la Navigation
Adrienne en Afrique et i Madagascar). These African States were formerly
'See Larsen, Liability of Air Traffic Control Agencies to Foreign Air Carriers, IL DIRITTO
AEREO ANNO III-II TRIM, 5-6 (1964).
2 ICAO Doc. AN/WP-1702, 16 July 1957.
[ Vol. 3 4
AIR SAFETY SYMPOSIUM
French Colonial possessions. The convention creating ASECNA was signed
at Saint-Louis de Senegal on 12 December 1959. In Central America, five
States signed a convention at Tegucigalpa in Honduras, on 26 February
1960, creating the Society for Air Navigation Services for Central America.
Finally, six Western European States signed a convention at Brussels on
13 December 1960, creating Eurocontrol.
The reasons leading to the establishment of these three organizations dis-
play certain similarities and certain disparities. Europe and Central America
found themselves faced with similar problems. In the preamble to the
Central America Convention there is a direct reference to the coming of
jet aircraft. Likewise, in the preamble to the Eurocontrol Convention the
signatory States express their awareness of the technical and operational
requirements generated by the characteristics of modern aircraft and
equipment. The two areas have similarities from the politico-geographical
viewpoint. They form a compact entity-many of the States are small in
area-and both regions have relatively high traffic densities.
In the case of the States of former French Africa, the situation was
somewhat different. Historically, ASECNA is the result of the French
Civil Aviation Administration's handling of air traffic services in the area.
Upon decolonization, aid is usually provided to the new State by the
former colonial power.3 It was only logical, in the case of French speaking
Africa, to maintain, as far as possible, the existing administrative unity
of air traffic services organization.
Thus, for French Africa the administrative factor was preponderant.
For Europe and for Central America technical and politico-geographical
reasons predominated. In all cases the economic factor had an influence.
III. DIFFERENCES AMONG INTERNATIONAL ATC AGENCIES
In the above three examples of collective provision of air traffic services,
the broad institutional and administrative principles are the same. There
are, nevertheless, many differences of an organic, legal, and financial na-
ture. The most striking difference between Eurocontrol and the two other
organizations is the mandate provided in the basic Conventions. Euro-
control's activity is at present limited to the upper airspace.' The reason
behind the creation of Eurocontrol was the introduction by the world's
airlines of turbine engined aircraft with a high optimum operating alti-
tude. With the growth of air traffic, the constantly increasing number of
civil aircraft in the upper airspace, which had virtually been the preserve
of military aircraft, gave rise to the problem of air traffic safety. The
implication was that aircraft movements at those altitudes should be
regulated from the ground by appropriate control centers, just like aircraft
movements in the control areas of the lower airspace. One of the con-
'Tancelin, The Air Navigation Security Agency for Africa and Madagascar, 1963 (Thesis
submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research, McGill University).
' International Convention Relating to Co-operation for the Safety of Air Navigation (Euro-
control), 13 Dec. 1960, arts. 1 & 38 (hereinafter Eurocontrol Convention).
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clusions which emerged from the studies which preceded the creation of
Eurocontrol was that air traffic problems in the upper airspace were differ-
ent from those posed by the control of aircraft in lower airspace. Accord-
ingly, it was decided to entrust to Eurocontrol the provision of air traffic
services in the upper airspace. Also, provision of services by Eurocontrol
for the lower airspace was envisaged in the Convention. In Article 2, it is
provided that Contracting Parties may request a decision from Euro-
control's Permanent Commission for the Safety of Air Navigation that
services for the whole or part of their lower airspace be entrusted to
Eurocontrol. No decision in this direction has been taken to date. Contra-
wise, in the Conventions of Saint-Louis and of Tegucigalpa, no distinction
is made between upper and lower airspace.
The three organizations also display institutional differences. Eurocontrol
is comprised to two organs: the Permanent Commission for the Safety of
Air Navigation and the Air Traffic Services Agency. The competencies of
the two organs are quite distinct. Various areas of action reserved to the
Permanent Commission are specified in the Convention.' This duality as
regards competence is not found in either ASECNA or COCESNA.
All three organizations are invested with legal personality. In the case
of Eurocontrol, consistent with the duality of its organs, the agency alone
represents the organization and acts in its name. Another distinctive fea-
ture of Eurocontrol lies in determination of the configuration of the air-
space in which the agency provides air traffic services by the Permanent
Commission, that is, by one of Eurocontrol's organs and not by each
Member State.!
What distinguishes ASECNA financially is continued technical and
financial assistance by a former colonial power to newly independent
States. The situation is unique. France is a signatory to the Convention
of Saint-Louis de Senegal, but her territory and the airspace above it do
not form part of the area for which ASECNA has the duty to provide air
traffic services. To the extent that ASECNA depends on the financial con-
tributions from its Member States, France is responsible for the lion's share.!
ASECNA is authorized to charge users for the services it renders;' user
charges were introduced by a decision of the Governing Board in 1962.
For its financing of services, the Society in Central America depends solely
upon charges collected from the users of the services it provides.' Euro-
control depends on the contribution of its Member States, but the sharing
of these contributions is done on a basis laid down in the Convention
itself. The States contribute to Eurocontrol's investment budget in pro-
portion to their Gross National Products. Operational expenses are shared
by he application of a formula which takes account of two factors: GNP
5 Eurocontrol Convention, arts. 1, 6, 7, & 14; Statute of the Agency, art. 2.
6 Eurocontrol Convention, art. 6(2) (d).
'See Cahier des Charges, annexed to Convention Relative i la Creation d'une Agence Charge
de G~rer les Installations et Services Destines i Assurer la S~curit6 de la Navigation A6rienne en
Afrique et i Madagascar, 12 Dec. 1959, arts. 4 & 19 (hereinafter ASECNA).8 ASECNA, art. 20.
'Convention of Tegucigalpa, art. 23.
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and the proportion of the services rendered to aircraft of the State." Col-
lection by Eurocontrol of user charges is not excluded." It is envisaged
in Eurocontrol's basic texts. The organization could, therefore, one day
draw part of its operational income from the users. At present, however,
it depends entirely upon the contribution of its members to meet its finan-
cial commitments, both in the operational and investment domains.
IV. ATC LIABILITY
As shown by the discussions of the ICAO Legal Committee, to which
non-contractual liability in respect to air traffic control was first referred
at its 13th Session in 1960, this is a highly complex problem. One of the
characteristics of internation air traffic control organizations is that they
are not subject to any specific legal order. In addition, these organizations
have no rule making authority. They apply to air traffic control the regula-
tions in force in the airspace entrusted to them. They are, nevertheless,
entitled to give all necessary instructions to aircraft commanders."
Because these organizations do not enjoy legal immunity, it was con-
sidered necessary to specify in the basic texts governing their activities the
non-contractual liability regulations to which they are subject. The basic
texts of the COCESNA and ASECNA provided that these organizations
should make good any damage caused to third parties in providing con-
trol services," and although it is not expressly stated, it would appear that
liability resulting from negligence is evisioned.' Article 25, paragraph 2,
of the Eurocontrol Convention expressly states that the organization "shall
make reparation for damages caused by the negligence of its organs or of
its servants in the scope of their employment as that damage can be
attributed to them." This is a special system of liability. It is one based
on the notion of fault and the concept that Eurocontrol is directly, and
not simply indirectly, liable for the negligence of its organs and servants.
The last sentence in the Article adds that the foregoing provision "shall
not preclude the right to other compensation under the national law of
the Contracting Parties." The Eurocontrol Convention is the only inter-
national agreement with autonomous and virtually comprehensive liability
regulations which do not rule out the application of national law.' This
provision specifying that liability does not preclude the right to other
compensation under national law may raise difficulties of interpretation.
In none of the three organizations is there any provision for limiting
liability. This is not in line with the viewpoint recently adopted by the
10 Eurocontrol Convention, Statute of the Agency annexed to the Convention, arts. 23 & 26.
'lid. at art. 22(9); Eurocontrol Convention, art. 20.
"'Convention of Tegucigalpa, art. 9; Eurocontrol Convention, art. 17; Cahier des Charges
annexed to ASECNA Convention, art. 5.1Convention of Tegucigalpa, art. 10; Eurocontrol Convention, art. 18.
14 Convention of Tegucigalpa, art. 5; Cahier des Charges annexed to ASECNA Convention,
arts. 13 & 17.
15With regard to ASECNA in particular, see Larsen, supra note 1, at 18 & 29.
" Rudolf, Die ausserbertragliche Haftung der Europaischen Organisation zur Sicherung der
Lufibart (Eurocontrol), 1 ZEITSCHRIFT FUR LUFTRECHT UND WELTIAUMRECHTSFRAGEN 58
(1965).
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ICAO Legal Committee at its 16th Session, when spadework was done on
an international convention for the liability of air traffic control services.
The Committee considered that the convention should provide for limited
liability, although the ceiling envisaged was fairly high. It is worth re-
membering in this connection that the whole question of limited liability
is open to debate.' The Legal Committee agreed that the system of liability
contained in the convention should be based on the notion of fault. In
this respect the Committee has come to recommend a solution which has
been considered advisable in the case of ASECNA, COCESNA and Euro-
control.
During its 16th Session, the ICAO Legal Committee reaffirmed's that its
aim should be to embody international regulations in a special convention
on the liability of air traffic control services. It can be hoped that this
objective will be fulfilled despite the many major difficulties that stand
in the wa'y, and that one day soon the liability of control services will be
given an international legal basis in a convention, just as other problems in
the domain of air transport and air navigation were resolved by the Con-
ventions of Warsaw, Rome and Guadalajara.
V. CONCLUSION
In international air transportation, cooperation between nations is al-
ready well established. This cooperation is not being extended into the
field of air traffic control. And so, civil aviation, which forms a vital
link between nations, will go on asserting itself ever more firmly as an
instrument of internation cooperation, understanding and agreement.
17 See Larsen, Air Traffic Control: A Recommendation for a Proof of Fault System Witbout a
Limitation of Liability, 32 J. AIR L. & Com. 3 (1966).
"8ICAO Doc. 8704-LC/155, 22 Sept. 1967, Annex E.
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